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ext to a good ten-cent cigar, what the world needs is a good
theory in social science: perhaps a precise one like classical
mechanics, or a very general one like organic evolution, or
even a rich and suggestive classification like the periodic table of chemical elements. How shall social scientists occupy their time until the
millennium comes? Might they even hasten its arrival? One useful
pursuit, Bob Wolfson argues, is to deconfuse the terminology and clean
up the concepts. I cannot quarrel with that, for the Augean stables need
all of the housekeeping they can get; but I think we should not expect
significant theoretical advances through a rigorous formalization of
existing theories in a precisely defined lexicon.
The social scientist must not be blamed for looking enviously at the
elegant constructions of natural science and for supposing that, if social
science is ultimately to be like natural science, it must be as rigorous in
statement, with the logical connections from term to term and from
sentence to observable fact clearly and unambiguously defined. But the
social scientist must beware of engaging in sympathetic magic,
imagining that by putting on the glittering mask of natural science he
can capture its explanatory power-a hope, as it were, of gilt by association. If we look back at great examples of rigorous formulations of
scientific theories-geometry formalized by Euclid and reformalized by
Hilbert, or quantum mechanics axiomatized by Von Neumann-we
notice that such formalization lies at the end rather than at the beginning of a rich and fruitful period of theory building. Typically, in fact,
when a theory is formalized (and by this I do not mean just mathematicized), it is no longer an object of active research. A subject under
active development is commonly marked by usefully elastic terminology
and sometimes by downright confusion over fundamental concepts.
Consider, for example, the seventeenth-century disputes about the
proper measure of force (even Newton's statement of the second law
uses force where we would use impulse); or whether it is quantity of
motion or living force that is conserved (we now call the first linear
momentum and the second mechanical energy). Yet mechanics grew
rapidly, with terminological clarification proceeding hand in hand with
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the mathematical articulation of theory.
There is, however, an important case in which a wholesale reform of
terminology occurred at the beginning of the modern development of a
science. I have in mind Lavoisier's Elements of Chemistry. But even
here, the reformulation of vocabulary proceeded in accordance with the
fundamental theoretical idea that chemistry must henceforth focus its
attention on the conservation of mass. As Lavoisier said, a really
satisfying terminology ought to reflect the deeper articulations of the
subject. A good theory must, as Plato told us, carve nature at the joints.
Premature fixing of vocabulary around the concepts of an immature or
superficial theory is likely to have the lasting interest of a meticulous
formulation of the possible varieties of phlogiston theories .

I

should now like to turn to some more particular difficulties. The
first of these concerns how we are to understand Wolfson's P5:

F-bel-(p) may be read as Individuals which have F believe that p
Wolfson goes on to explain:
This sentence scheme is true for a given choice of statement p
and, say, predicate G, just in case the predicate F is manifest
[I take this to mean nondispositional and observational] and the
fact that an individual satisfies it is accepted by the investigator as
a sufficient condition for his believing that p.

Suppose the predicate F is understood as genuflects upon entering
a Roman Catholic church, while p is the statement, The pope is
the vicar of Christ on earth.
This is a scheme which serves to define a particular belief (which
we usually understand to be a mental state) by associating
statements about it with a manifest predicate. That is, in this
theoretical language, genuflection upon entering a Roman
Catholic church would be seen by the investigator as grounds for
saying the individual in question believes the pope is Christ's
vicar on earth. In another more complete language there might be
several manifest predicates (e.g., in addition to F, perhaps D, dips
hand in holy water font upon entering Roman Catholic church; C,
carries rosary into church), any one of which, being satisfied, is
taken by the investigator as grounds for saying the belief is held
by the subject individual.
At first we are told that an individual's satisfying F is a sufficient condition for his believing that p. But this cannot, in general, be correct. In
the above instance, the individual might be a follower of Ian Paisley
wishing to remain incognito, or an enthusiastic Anglican ecumenicist,
or an atheist I once heard about who crossed himself once each day, "just
in case they're right."
It would be more prudent to take the second reading, that, for
example, "genuflection upon entering a Roman Catholic church would
be . . . grounds for saying the individual in question believes the pope is
Christ's vicar on earth." And so it would, given appropriate background
knowledge of the likely intentions of the person in question. But this
raises three problems for someone who has what I take to be Wolfson's
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perspective. The first is that intention is not a manifest predicate and,
indeed, is supposed to be defined in terms of PS. The difficulty is that
application of PS seems to presuppose knowledge of either intentions
or desires. The second problem is that ascriptions of intention are so
context-dependent that it seems very difficult to arrive at laws
involving beliefs that will be both precise and general. This casts doubt
on the lexicon's ability to contribute to a nomological social science. The
third problem is that if no collection of manifest predicates can provide
sufficient conditions for individual x believing p, they cannot properly
be used to define the expression x believes that p. Rather they can, if well
chosen, give us only inductive reasons for ascribing a belief in p to x.

I

have a further question concerning the use of PS . Earlier we were
told:

Successful completion of this task [construction of a formal
lexicon] should allow all formal scientific discourse in the field to
be conducted in a lexicon consisting of defined terms and the
primitives, plus all of logic and mathematics and other mature
sciences, plus the names of individuals (i.e., elementary objects of
the field), in place of the natural language.
The question is this: In what language is pin F-bel-p to be expressed? If
it be a natural language, this aim is thereby foresworn . If it be the artificial language, the lexicon will have to contain expressive resources
approaching those of a natural language. In that event, I anxiously await
the lexicon's rendering of]ones believes that God is three persons in one.
The matter of how the lexicon is to represent serviceable concepts
even in its own field is a touchy one, and I am not sure that its authors
are fully sensitive to the problems involved. Take, for example, the
notion of revolution. We read such sentences as these:
If the reorganization takes place without the consent of those
whose agreement is required for lawful reorganization, the reorganization is a revolution. There are ... four sorts . . .. If incumbencies and structures of relations change, there is a more
sweeping sort of revolution. If these as well as roles change, the
revolution is even more substantial. If all these, and goals, change,
there is a true social revolution.
Now lawful is a normative notion. It certainly is integral to some uses
of revolution, but just how does it get into the lexicon? As I survey the
primitives, I can find only descriptive notions. Among philosophers
there has been a long-standing presumption against the acceptability of
arguments whose premises consist only of statements about what is the
case but whose conclusion states what ought to be the case. Similarly,
there is a presumption against the claim that a normative concept can
be defined adequately by means of descriptive concepts alone. The
presumption can, perhaps, be defeated; but we need an argument to do
so, and none is in view.
Oddly enough, the concept of social revolution is linked to the
concept of lawfulness in the passage I have just quoted. Yet it seems
plain enough that social revolution has been repeatedly applied to large
changes in organization that have occurred without substantial violation of the law, although with considerable perturbation in people's
habits. It thus appears that revolution was construed too narrowly from
the beginning.

Published by SURFACE, 1982

3

DYSLEXIA
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE-93
Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1982], Art.
15

An examination of the Oxford English Dictionary tells us that revolution, in a relevant nonpolitical sense, is "an instance of great change
or alteration in affairs or in some particular thing"; annoyingly vague,
that-if one wants to take revolution as a term of science. For how
extensive must a change be in order to be a great change? A bad term for
a science-to-be, perhaps. (Geology, however, manages to limp along
without an exact distinction between hills and mountains . But then,
nobody cares about formalized geology. Does that cast doubt on its
status as a science?) We could, of course, legislate the scope of great in
this case and thus establish precise boundaries for revolution. On the
other hand, why should we? A~ things stand, it is a distinct advantage to
keep the term vague so we can slot it in differently in different circumstances. It may make a poor term for social science but a nice one for
social studies.
I could be quite wrong, of course. Perhaps revolution could, with a bit
of trimming, become a prime lexical item for the World's First Real
Social Theory. But for now, I'd rather you asked me about the good
ten-cent cigar.
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